has been given as 685/1286 or 692/1293, 11 but recent scholarship argues for 715-6/ 1316. 12 ) More recently, Tariq Ramadan has spoken of the universe being a revealed book like the Qur'an. 13 As was the case in Christendom, arguments in the vein of natural theology developed in an intellectual context in which a burgeoning scientific enterprise had become part of a tradition of religious scholarship. 14 Some of these scientific texts from Islamic societies noted how an understanding of God's creation could enhance one's appreciation of God's role in creation and perhaps one's understanding of how God operates.
15
To an extent, such arguments were also a component of kalām texts, particularly as kalām became more ontologically and less theologically oriented. Influential secondary literature on science and falsafa in kalām 16 has presumed the centrality of the Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām (composed c. 730/1330) of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/ 1355), as an example of a kalām text that was oriented more to classifying existence (what is matter?) than to classically theological questions (is God just?), and which, therefore, appropriated concepts from science and falsafa with remarkable facility. 17 Al-Ījī did argue that details of nature could tell one something about God, though only about God's providence and solicitude. 18 While Sabra argued that al-Ījī saw scientific theories simply as explanatory devices that could neither be verified or denied, 19 a forthcoming article of mine argues that, actually, al-Ījī sometimes argued that scientific explanations were probably not correct. 20 And if the scientific explanations were probably not correct, then al-Ījī could have proposed better alternatives, but he did not. In order to argue most forcefully that celestial matter and phenomena were due only to God, it turns out that al-Ījī chose to argue as much as possible against any human attempt to explain the heavens, a line of argumentation that compromised nature's legibility or intelligibility. For example, al-Ījī questioned the astronomers' principle that the celestial orbs moved with uniform circular motion. 21 Many of al-Ījī's statements that were critical of astronomy also made tendentiously incorrect statements about astronomy that had the effect of decreasing astronomy's intellectual prestige, suggesting that science texts were not simply a source for mutakallimūn, but that mutakallimūn were also in a debate with scholars of science over how nature could best serve rational speculation about God. Arguments in the vein of natural theology served some of kalām's ends, but not all of them. The question of whether natural theological knowledge was certain was, from the perspective of kalām, most complex, as it cut between, on one hand, kalām's claim that Islam did not need to be accepted uncritically, and, on the other hand, kalām's need to undercut and underplay some findings of science (for example, that intermediate causes, though their existence could not be demonstrated conclusively, played an important role in explanations).
scholars did not understand al-Ījī to be offering them any sort of compromise. 23 They implied that there was no purpose to evocations of the natural world in kalām texts if there was no positive agenda for the accurate, rationalist study of nature. The present article attempts to expand our knowledge of this discussion of natural theology and how a different perspective on the value of arguments in the vein of natural theology existed in works of tafsīr. General works on natural theology, when they do turn to Islam, tend to confine themselves to kalām, and then only to certain mutakallimūn.
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This paper focuses on the work of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī, and compares and contrasts comments that he made about the natural world in his kalām text and his tafsīr. 25 Al-Bayḍāwī is a worthwhile figure to study for three reasons. First, his kalām text, Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, was a model for al-Ījī's Mawāqif both in form and content, including the implicit criticisms of scientific epistemology. 26 This attention to the prehistory of al-Ījī's Mawāqif is valuable also because we see how the Mawāqif was just a data point (albeit an important one) in the history of a debate about the significance and role of a scientific study of nature for learning about God.
Excellent evidence for how Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār reflects an earlier stage in the incorporation of science into kalām lies in later scholars' response to Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār's examination of the source of the planets' luminosity. The evidence itself lies in texts that followed some statements by al-Bayḍāwī. Given that the moon's phases suggested that the moon, if it was luminescent, might not be equally luminescent, al-Bayḍāwī used the evidence of lunar eclipses to argue that one could not argue that the moon was half illuminated and half darkened, itself rotating in its orb. 27 Had that been the case, there would have been no way to explain the sudden darkening of the moon during a lunar eclipse. Al-Bayḍāwī's point mirrored astronomers' intuition, made on the basis of observations, that the sun illuminated the moon and that the path of the moon was inclined to the sun's by five degrees. 28 Then, al-Bayḍāwī's commentator Maḥmūd al-Iṣfāhānī (d. 749/1348), whose other comments suggested a sympathy to astronomy, argued that if it was true that an eclipse occurred at the opposition of the sun and the moon, then the lack of an eclipse at every opposition might indicate that the moon's light does not come from the sun. 29 Al-Iṣfahānī's comments on this point indicated that he did not understand that the moon's path was inclined to the sun's path by five degrees, the reason why not every opposition of the moon and sun would lead to an eclipse. Subsequently, al-Ījī went on to make the argument that a body other than the sun, moon and earth played a role in eclipses, 30 meaning that al-Ījī rejected the explanation for eclipses that al-Bayḍāwī (and al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111)) had accepted from the astronomers. The fact that alIṣfahānī's account of astronomy was erroneous and al-Ījī's was heavily sceptical indicates that Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār was written at an early stage of kalām's shift to a more ontological approach, a shift traced thoroughly by Heidrun Eichner.
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The second reason why al-Bayḍāwī is interesting is that both al-Bayḍāwī and al-Ījī were associated with the Ilkhānid court at Tabrīz, a court that also 34 The mutakallimūn's position on science and falsafa was not completely univocal. The third reason for interest in al-Bayḍāwī was that an important dimension of these discussions existed in tafsīr. Al-Bayḍāwī wrote two texts that dealt with natural theology; each took a different side in the debate. 35 We shall begin with al-Bayḍāwī's treatise on kalām, Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār min maṭāliʿ al-anẓār, and its reception via al-Iṣfahānī's 36 commentary (Maṭāliʿ al-anẓār) 37 before moving to the tafsīr (Anwār al-tanzīl). 38 From the purview of kalām, the celestial bodies were relevant inasmuch as they were a category of existent. These bodies were ostensibly composed of indivisible atoms (ajzāʾ). 39 The third book (bāb) of Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār is about bodies (ajsām) and their divisions (aqsām). 40 In addition to compound bodies, there were simple bodies that were spherical and divided into elemental (ʿunṣuriyyāt) and celestial (falakiyyāt), the latter being the orbs and the planets (the premise for studying astronomy within kalām). 41 Astronomers often spoke of a single orb for each planet, which was shorthand for the complex of orbs that accounted for all of a planet's motions. Thus, it was commonplace to speak of a cosmos of nine orbs, with seven orbs for the five planets and two luminaries, one (the eighth) for the motion of the fixed stars in precession, and one (the ninth) to account for the cosmos' diurnal motion.
Al-Bayḍāwī questioned some of the astronomers' conclusions about the ninth orb. He remarked that observations of the cosmos' diurnal motion furnished evidence for a ninth orb, but not for the astronomers' conclusion that the ninth orb encompassed all of the bodies. 42 The issue here is less whether the ninth orb encompassed all other bodies including, implicitly, the other eight orbs, but if observations alone could be a sufficient basis for a demonstration of whether the ninth orb necessarily encompassed everything. It is not clear, though, how the ninth orb would move the other eight orbs with the daily motion if it did not encompass them. And if the ninth orb did not encompass all other celestial bodies, were there some bodies outside of the ninth orb? But, then, why not place those bodies in an orb responsible for the daily motion?
Actually, although observations alone would not be sufficient evidence for a ninth orb, 43 once one posits a ninth orb responsible for the daily motion, observations would necessitate that this ninth orb encompasses all others because all celestial bodies move with the daily motion. Al-Iṣfahānī, unfortunately, had no comment.
Al-Bayḍāwī's discussion of the orbs included other criticisms of the astronomers' presuppositions and conclusions that did spark a debate. For instance, al-Bayḍāwī wrote: 'One might say (li-qāʾil an yaqūl) if the impossibility of piercing [the orbs] is established, why is it not conceivable (limā lā yajūz) that each planet has a belt (niṭāq) that moves on its own or through the impulsion (iʿtimād) of the planets upon it?' 44 Al-Bayḍāwī's point, one with a history and a future, was that a system of rings, rather than orbs, each of which might be moved by something other than a soul, could just as easily account for the observations. 45 Al-Iṣfahānī contested al-Bayḍāwī, saying that if one were to look at astronomy and to consider the principles (uṣūl) upon which the discipline was constructed, then this objection would fall away. 46 Al-Iṣfahānī was probably saying that the impulsion (iʿtimād) of the planet on the ring would account for the motion of the ring that took the place of the epicycle that held the planet, but not the motion of the other rings (or orbs) that made up the complex of rings (or orbs) for a given planet. Those orbs, therefore, could not be moved through the impulsion of the planet upon them because a single mover could not cause two different motions.
The tenor of al-Iṣfahānī's comments reflected the position that astronomy was more valuable when studied on its own terms. Al-Jurjānī, in his gloss (ḥāshiya) on al-Iṣfahānī's commentary, noted that the mutakallimūn who criticised astronomy, al-Bayḍāwī being among them, did not produce evidence for their claims (e.g. the existence of a void). 47 Not only were arguments in the vein of natural theology less feasible the more difficult even a probable knowledge of the heavens' structure was, but furnishing evidence (istidlāl) from the natural world itself was key to the enterprise.
Finally, the questions of how the behaviour of the celestial bodies could be attributed to their composition and how much that behaviour depended directly on God's will had implications for what a study of nature could communicate. In Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, al-Bayḍāwī discussed, in the context of determining whether the heavens inherently moved with uniform circular motion, if the heavens' form could ever be separated (infakka) from the primal matter (al-hayūlā). While the falāsifa held that such a separation was impossible (qālū inna al-ṣūra lā tanfakk ʿan al-hayūlā), and that bodies (even elemental bodies) were combinations of a form with primal matter, al-Bayḍāwī rejected these arguments, understanding them to be based on the denial of a free-willed creator (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār). 48 That said, al-Bayḍāwī conceded that one might argue that the reason for the variations in the accidents and structures (hayʾāt) of the celestial bodies was variations in the celestial material (wa-ikhtilāf al-mawādd al-falakiyya sabab li-ikhtilāf al-aʿrāḍ wa'l-hayʾāt), 49 and not the accidents that God imparted to that material. This suggests al-Bayḍāwī's willingness to consider something other than the mutakallimūn's position that the orbs were made up of uniform atoms that differed only in the accidents that God imparted.
Al-Iṣfahānī's own position illustrates that there were scholars whose systems did not depend on the uniformity of celestial matter. He wrote: 'As for specifying the celestial bodies through their specific (nawʿiyya) forms, it might be argued that it is because every celestial sphere would have matter differing in quiddity from the matter of another … As for celestial bodies, every one of them would be specified by a particular quality because its matter receives only that quality.' 50 Thus, the immediate question was whether the differences were due to a form inherently connected to the substance or whether the matter of one orb could differ from the matter of another.
But, as al-Bayḍāwī pointed out, via the example of the terrestrial elements, uniform matter could exist without necessarily moving in circular motion. 51 As al-Iṣfahānī showed, the only way to distinguish celestial matter from elemental matter would be to say that one had the principle of uniform motion in it, and the other did not.
The conclusion was that the presence of this principle (athr) entailed the existence of the muʾaththir, the one who gave the principle. It is interesting that al-Bayḍāwī, in order to contend that the matter of the celestial orbs did not necessitate uniform circular motion portrayed the heavens differently than al-Ījī. Were one to propose unequal motions in the heavens, as al-Ījī did, the lack of certainty about the nature of the effect would lead to an inability to reason from the effect to the cause, the central preoccupation of arguments in the vein of natural theology. One would have to go directly to the only possible conclusion: that the motions were somehow due to God, though the study of nature would no longer be necessary to arrive at that conclusion. The more the mutakallimūn undercut astronomy and other human attempts to understand nature, the less powerful arguments in the vein of natural theology would be. 52 This brief survey of al-Bayḍāwī's presentation of astronomy in his kalām text, with an eye to al-Ījī's later Mawāqif, suggests that the mutakallimūn's position on the reliability of the astronomers' conclusions developed through a debate with those making arguments in the vein of natural theology. We will see that, in al-Bayḍāwī's tafsīr, Anwār al-tanzīl, arguments in the vein of natural theology received a great deal more attention and credence.
Not only was tafsīr a different genre, but, as Walid Saleh has argued tirelessly, tafsīr was the central Islamic discipline. 53 Al-Bayḍāwī wrote his tafsīr near the end of his life 54 in Tabrīz, stating in that text that tafsīr was the most important of the religious sciences (al-ʿulūm al-dīniyya). 55 While al-Bayḍāwī's tafsīr is not widely known for its incorporation of scientific content, it deserves examination due to al-Bayḍāwī's importance as an Ashʿarī mutakallim. Al-Bayḍāwī, in the introduction to his tafsīr, did not mention that he would draw on material from the natural sciences, but he did say that those suited to understanding tafsīr had to be familiar with material outside the religious sciences. 56 Nevertheless, al-Bayḍāwī's discussions of science were brief but well worth examining. I want to look at al-Bayḍāwī's comments on verses discussing the natural world in order to see the extent to which, in a different genre, al-Bayḍāwī saw science's depiction of nature as a means to learning about God.
The distinction between al-Bayḍāwī's activity in each genre was not absolute as there is at least one instance where al-Bayḍāwī's comments on a verse regarding the natural world reflected a caution about astronomy's conclusions similar to that found in his Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār. In his comments on Q. 57 This was a fascinating comment because it appeared to reflect the debate among astronomers, including al-Bayḍāwī's contemporary al-Shīrāzī, over whether there were seven, eight or nine orbs in the heavens. 58 A seven, eight and nine-orb cosmos each accounted for observations equally well. This debate was an excellent example of how closely a mutakallim and mufassir, al-Bayḍāwī, followed scientific debates with an acute sense of what was at stake and deployed these debates for an argument that followed the perspective on astronomy found in kalām texts. That is, astronomy could not approach the epistemological certainty of kalām if the astronomers themselves disagreed about something so fundamental as how many orbs there were. And if astronomers could not be sure about how many orbs there were, then there was no point in trying to learn about God through nature. Rather, the more reliable path would be to invoke God's omnipotence as a solution. In addition, al-Bayḍāwī's inclusion of this debate about astronomy, which occurred in the seventh/thirteenth century, and others complicates the regnant impression that al-Bayḍāwī's tafsīr was simply an Ashʿarised version of al-Zamakhsharī's (d. 538/1144) tafsīr.
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Elsewhere, though, when al-Bayḍāwī accepted the occasionalist principle of ʿāda ('habit'), he did not do so to diminish what one could learn about God through nature but to show that God created a habitual natural order. Al-Bayḍāwī's comments on Q. 41:53, We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in themselves, till it is clear to them that it is the truth, show how some perception of habitual occurrence (al-ʿāda) was important for grasping the Qur'an's reports of miracles. 60 Not surprisingly, al-Bayḍāwī understood outstanding events of the past as disruptions of custom (ʿalā wajh khāriq al-ʿāda) so as to argue that there was no other way to understand events such as the political successes of the early Muslims except as a result of God's favourable involvement. Then, regarding the Qur'an's phrase wa-fī anfusihim (in themselves), al-Bayḍāwī referred to the marvels (ʿajāʾib) of the human body. These marvels were not disruptions of habit, but instead evidence for the perfection of God's power (ʿalā kamāl al-qudra) and, hence, not beyond human understanding. Along those lines, regarding Q. 21:32, And We set up the heaven as a roof well-protected; yet still from Our signs they are turning away!, al-Bayḍāwī explained that the aforementioned signs were evidence for God's existence, unity, perfect power and wisdom; some of these signs were researched in the two sciences of physics and astronomy (fī ʿilmay al-ṭabīʿa wa'l-hayʾa). 61 Al-Bayḍāwī was, in fact,
reported to have written a summary work (mukhtaṣar) of astronomy as well as a commentary on al-Ṭūsī's Fuṣūl; neither text is extant.
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These albeit brief references to disciplines such as astronomy and physics have led scholars to detect a relationship with al-Rāzī's Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (aka al-Tafsīr al-kabīr) as well 63 which is evident as well in al-Bayḍāwī's comments on Q. 2:164, Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day and the ship that runs in the sea with profit to men, and the water God sends down from heaven therewith reviving the earth after it is dead and His scattering abroad in it all manner of crawling things, and the turning about of the winds and the clouds compelled between heaven and earth -surely there are signs for a people having understanding. This verse had been the occasion for a lengthy précis of astronomy in al-Rāzī's Mafātīḥ al-ghayb. 64 Al-Bayḍāwī's comments were much briefer, noting that others had gone on at greater length, but still informative, and they indicated a familiarity with astronomy. The thrust of al-Bayḍāwī's argument was that the evidence (dalāla) 65 for God's existence in Q. 2:164 boiled down to how there were many things that were created in a particular way even though many ways were possible. 66 Al-Bayḍāwī seemed, at first, to refer to the technical terminology of astronomy in order to argue that while there was order in nature, astronomy could not, on its own, justify the existing natural order, as opposed to another possible order. And his comments concluded with an admonition of the nobility of the science of kalām. 67 But, upon a closer reading, we shall see that al-Bayḍāwī's willingness to specify the way in which things were created, out of numerous possibilities, meant that Anwār al-tanzīl presented arguments squarely in the vein of natural theology.
Al-Bayḍāwī wrote that it was 'conceivable that the heavens not move, or that some of them move like the earth and that they move with the opposite of their [observed] motions. And that it is possible that the [celestial] equator becomes a circle passing through the poles and that they [the heavens] do not have an apex and nadir at all.' 68 The celestial equator is a projection of the earth's equator out towards the heavens.
Any circle passing through the north and south poles of the heavens would be perpendicular to the celestial equator. Al-Bayḍāwī argued that since the heavens did not inherently have an apex and nadir, their existence was an indication of God's wisdom and superiority over all who might oppose God. 69 Al-Rāzī had made a similar point when he noted that the designation of certain points as the poles, from among all the identical points on the orb, was a reflection of God's wisdom. 70 Al-Bayḍāwī might have seemed to be saying that there really was no reason comprehensible to humans why things were the way they were, namely why the equator was the equator and not inverted with a circle passing through the celestial poles. Moreover, arguing that the equator and circle passing through the celestial poles could have been exchanged and that the heavens' apex and nadir were not necessarily determined reminds one of al-Ījī's famous comment that astronomy's mathematical constructs, such as the celestial equator, were purely imaginary. 71 Al-Bayḍāwī, however, added some important nuance to the previous sentences, as he said more about why God's decision to place the equator where it was and the circles running through the celestial poles where they actually were could not have been capricious. He wrote: '[it is] in this way owing to its simplicity and the equivalence of its parts.' 72 The placement of the celestial equator, in fact, was not random because the earth's equator, of which the celestial equator was a projection, was also the circle running through locales in which day and night are the same length. Thus, al-Bayḍāwī has stated that the way that God actually created the universe was the best option. Moreover, God created the universe according to what his wisdom required (ʿalā mā tastadʿīhi ḥikmatuhu). 73 As al-Jurjānī would later say, in response to al-Ījī's charge that astronomy's mathematical constructs were purely imaginary, the circles were correctly imagined. 74 God's wisdom would be palpable only if the celestial equator really was the celestial equator; exploring the mathematical constructs, and, by extension, why they are correct, would yield insight into God's wisdom.
Al-Bayḍāwī also raised the question of the earth's motion in the aforementioned comments ('it is conceivable, for example, that the heavens do not move, or some of it, like the earth, with it moving with the opposite of its [the heavens'] motions'). 75 Before, during and after al-Bayḍāwī's lifetime, there was a debate in ʿilm al-hayʾa texts among al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), al-Shīrāzī, al-Nīsābūrī and al-Bīrjandī (d. 931-2/ 1525) about whether the earth's lack of a daily motion could be demonstrated observationally or whether recourse to physics, a branch of falsafa, was necessary. 76 To clarify, the earth's annual motion about the sun was not being considered. 77 AlBayḍāwī took advantage of this debate, just as he did with the debate over the number of orbs, to communicate that there was no reason why God could not have created a moving earth; a stationary earth was by no means necessary. And consider alBayḍāwī's comments on Q. 22:65, He holds back heaven lest it should fall upon the earth, save by His leave? Surely God is All-gentle to men, All-compassionate: 'that which had the inclination to fall could also receive its opposite'. 78 Since the heavens do not fall, and since God created a stationary earth, we have another case where the findings of science match, and therefore communicate, the determinations of God's wisdom.
Al-Bayḍāwī's comments on Q. 55:7, and heaven -He raised it up, and set the Balance) made a general point that creation could be a source for insight into the rationale 79 behind God's actions. Al-Bayḍāwī explained, first, that the heavens were the starting point and revealer of God's judgements (manshaʾ aqḍiyatihi wa-mutanazzil aḥkāmihi). 80 God's setting the balance meant that God bestowed on each person was what each deserved (waffara ʿalā kull mustaʿidd mustaḥaqqahu).
God also ordered the affairs of the world (intaẓama amr al-ʿālam) and regulated the system of duties and obligations (al-ḥuqūq wa'l-mawājib). 81 Though al-Bayḍāwī did propose a system where the heavens were an intermediary cause of terrestrial events, there was no evidence that he accepted a system of astrology wherein God's judgements might become intelligible by reading the heavens. Rather, examples of order and foresight in nature communicated additional dimensions of God's wisdom. In a comment on Q. 20:53, He who appointed the earth to be a cradle (mahdan) for you, and therein threaded roads for you, and sent down water out of heaven, and therewith We have brought forth divers kinds of plants, al-Bayḍāwī referred to God as muṭāʿ ('one who is obeyed') in the course of commenting on thereby We have brought forth. 82 The fact that God produced water from the heavens that was then channelled between mountains was part of the evidence (dalāʾil) for God's wisdom and power. Characterising God as one who is obeyed has overtones of al-Ghazālī's discussion of God's causal role in Mishkāt al-anwār ('The Niche of Lights'). 83 That characterisation of God also bolstered al-Bayḍāwī's contention, regarding Q. 55:7, that a dimension of that natural order was the reward for and punishment of humans' actions. Just as the Qur'an stated that God was just, al-Bayḍāwī has argued that God's justice is manifested in the natural world. 84 In Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, al-Bayḍāwī wrote that God's wisdom was evident to whoever reflected on the wonders of nature, be they the wonders of the human body or the arrangements of the celestial orbs. 85 In the tafsīr, however, al-Bayḍāwī has given many examples of how this wisdom was manifested in nature.
Finally, when al-Bayḍāwī used science to rationalise the occurrence of miracles, his arguments had the effect of making God's actions more transparent. 86 Al-Bayḍāwī's comment resembled, but was not identical to, al-Rāzī's. 87 Al-Rāzī had noted the same ratio between the sizes of the earth and sun, but added that when the sun rose, it did so quickly (fī zamān laṭīf sarīʿ), though not necessarily in a second. Since God moves a much larger body so quickly, on a daily basis, moving Muḥammad from Mecca to Jerusalem would be comparatively easy. Science gave greater insight into God's workings; science was never an argument for the suspension of rationalist investigation.
These passages from al-Bayḍāwī's tafsīr that read the book of nature to learn about God were notable because they depended on astronomy's conclusions, including those about the relative dimensions of celestial bodies that could not be established purely deductively. Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, like other kalām texts of the time, began with a section on demonstration, perhaps to remind the reader of the unparalleled demonstrative certainty afforded by kalām. 88 Al-Bayḍāwī remarked on the difficulties of correct speculative reasoning (al-naẓar al-ṣaḥīḥ) when he reported on the geometers' (al-muhandisūn) 89 view of correct speculation for knowledge of God, as they denied the possibility of such speculation for theology (ilāhiyyāt). 90 One problem that this group saw was that the entity closest to a human was his or her soul, and given disagreements that philosophers had over psychology, how much less certain our knowledge would be regarding the heavens, something far away from humans. Al-Bayḍāwī took this position to be an acknowledgment of how, when the wahm ('estimative faculty') works with the intellect, the false can resemble the true. 91 As an indication that al-Bayḍāwī's cautions about knowledge not based on deduction did not diminish the attraction of arguments in the vein of natural theology, al-Iṣfahānī commented that the starting point for inductions about God would be the natural sciences. 92 Astronomers recognised that some of their conclusions could not be demonstrated deductively, but had found other ways to argue for the truth and/or probative 93 value of their findings. 94 These arguments were reflected in Anwār al-tanzīl (but not in Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār). Al-Bayḍāwī investigated, in his comments on Q. 3:190, Surely in the creation of the heavens and earth and in the alternation of night and day there are signs for men possessed of minds, how certain people's intellects would be more likely than others to perceive and grasp the signs of God's power in nature through non-deductive processes. Specifically, it was the intellects that are freest from the blemishes of the senses (al-ḥiss) and the imagination (al-wahm) that were the intended recipients of the signs. 95 It is those whose souls were least corrupted from their original fiṭra who were most able to grasp the import of God's signs in nature. Those of uncorrupted intellect (khāliṣa ʿan shawāʾib al-ḥiss) were those best suited to going beyond recognising that nature was a manifestation of God's wisdom to comprehending the manifestations of God's wisdom in nature. Gutas has found that fiṭra salīma could be very close to ḥads (either 'conjecture' or 'intuition'), suggesting that philosophers and scientists thought that some intellects were better suited than others to grasping the workings of nature. 96 Al-Bayḍāwī justified his interpretation by adducing a ḥadīth in which Muḥammad said, 'Woe to he who read it and did not contemplate it.' 97 Al-Bayḍāwī's own comments referred back to the signs mentioned in Sūrat al-Baqara, so he must have been thinking of a way for certain people to conceive of or perceive these things without being led astray by their imagination and sense perception. Anwār al-tanzīl's amenability to arguments in the vein of natural theology came from its acceptance of astronomy's non-demonstrative arguments and conclusions as a starting point for reading the book of nature.
A key axis of the debate over astronomy's non-demonstrative methods was about the reality of mental existents; al-Bayḍāwī expressed his concerns, in Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, over how the existence of mental existents was demonstrated. He reported that the philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) classified existence as either external (khārijī) or mental (dhihnī), whereas the mutakallimūn classified existence into that which had no predecessor (mā lā awwal li-wujūdihi) and into that which did. 98 Al-Bayḍāwī commented that he would not accept something's mental existence without a proof. 99 Al-Iṣfahānī explained: 'If it were said: how is it possible to doubt something's mental existence, while that thing is being conceived (ʿinda taṣawwur al-shayʾ), as conceiving it consists of its being in the mind, one would respond that while conceiving something consists of its existence in the mind, the conception of that thing is not that thing itself, but is instead added to that thing. Thus it is possible for us to doubt its mental existence, while a conception of it is being formed, and it is possible to deny something's mental existence while acknowledging that it is being conceived of.' 100 Along those lines, al-Bayḍāwī denied that the Platonic forms were eternally (thus necessarily) existent. 101 Al-Bayḍāwī's predecessor Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī wrote a brief treatise on a mode of existence known as nafs al-amr ('the thing in itself'). This was a mode of existence that did not arise in Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār (or in al-Ījī's Mawāqif), but was clearly important as a foundation for arguments made in the vein of natural theology. 102 In that treatise, al-Ṭūsī argued that mathematical ideas could have a real existence beyond their conception in the intellect. 103 When an intelligent person judged (ḥakama) that the diagonal of a quadrilateral was not common with its side (as opposed to an ignoramus who judged that they were), this had to occur through a comparison/confirmation (muṭābaqa) with something called nafs al-amr. The nafs al-amr existed outside of the intellect, but did not have a position (ghayr dhī waḍʿ).
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It did not exist by having a position because it could not be described through the categories nor could it be attained through sense perception. The nafs al-amr could exist on its own without a connection to any other existent. One could come to a conclusion about the diagonal of a quadrilateral without comparison to any material quadrilateral. The nafs al-amr was not God because the nafs al-amr entailed multiplicity, while God did not, nor was the nafs al-amr equivalent to the forms because the forms existed through something else (kānat qāʾima bi-ghayrihā), while the nafs al-amr did not. 105 Al-Ṭūsī concluded that the nafs al-amr was the universal intellect (ʿaql al-kull), which he identified with the Qur'an's references to al-lawḥ almaḥfūẓ and al-kitāb al-mubīn. 106 Al-Ṭūsī's argument about the nafs al-amr meant that the source of astronomy's mathematical constructs was God and that something that existed in the nafs al-amr was true even if its existence could not be established through deduction. Though I have not found al-Bayḍāwī discussing the concept of nafs al-amr in the tafsīr, accepting it as a mode of existence would certainly make arguments in the vein of natural theology, particularly those founded on astronomy's mathematical constructs, more authoritative.
Al-Bayḍāwī's position in kalām, that some theories of astronomy were not only not demonstrable but also possibly wrong, stemmed from the underlying position that mental existence without a corresponding external existent was impossible. Nevertheless, al-Bayḍāwī did hold, in Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, that study of the natural world, including the heavens, could enhance one's appreciation of God's wisdom. Such study would be all the more worthwhile the more one had confidence in the findings of science. Al-Bayḍāwī's tafsīr (Anwār al-tanzīl) shows us that there was another discourse about the use of disciplines such as astronomy in religious texts, for fields such as astronomy could give greater insight into God's creation than they did in kalām texts. The ability of scientists to argue in the vein of natural theology was a strong position and one that must have compensated for their methods of demonstration that could not always be rigorously deductive. How else to explain al-Bayḍāwī's relative preference for natural theological arguments in Anwār al-tanzīl? Thus, the mutakallimūn's criticisms of astronomy must have been intended to weaken a worthy rival. 
